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Abstract
Agents are an emerging technology that grants programmers a new way to exploit distributed
resources. Role is a powerful concept that can be used to model agent interactions, both between
different agents and between agents and environments. Roles allow agents to dynamically acquire
capabilities to perform specific tasks, and therefore enable separation of concerns and code
reusability in software development and maintenance. Permissions and security issues related to
role’s use should be carefully taken into account, especially when the agent scenario becomes open,
including even mobile agents. In a Java agent scenario, we believe that the standard policy file
mechanism does not suffice, because a fine grain permission management is required. This paper
focuses on how to exploit the Java Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS) at the role level
in order to apply authorizations and local policies to Java agents for controlling the use of their roles.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Today’s technologies for developing enterprise applications are commonly based on
the traditional client–server paradigm, such as EJB [15]. This leads to a centralized
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architecture, which can hardly face issues arising in dynamic and variable environments.
Emerging trends focus on collaborative distributed computing, and also on sharing
information across the Internet. In this scenario, the use of agents can provide interesting
solutions for facing the dynamism and for granting the required adaptability. An agent is an
autonomous software entity, which performs its tasks without requiring a continuous user
involvement, even being able to play on behalf of its owner. The agent-oriented paradigm
is emerging as a feasible approach for the development of today’s complex software
systems [11,12]. In fact, the agent-oriented paradigm allows developers to naturally
deal with distributed and concurrent environments, where different tasks are assigned to
different agents, which can run simultaneously. This leads to the constitution of agent
societies [9] and, more generally, of multi-agent systems (for short, MASs), where agents
compete and/or cooperate in order to complete their task(s). As a consequence, a key
issue in the development of complex agent systems (such as MASs) is the management
of interactions between agents, which must be designed and developed carefully.
The exploitation of roles represents a good paradigm for dealing with agent interactions,
thanks to the separation of concerns and code reusability it provides. The idea is to embed
all interaction-related aspects (such as the communication protocols and commitments)
into entities (the roles) that can be exploited by different agents. This grants a good
modularity, allowing an agent to delegate some specific issues to the role it is playing, and
thus keeping the agent code simple and easy to maintain. Furthermore, roles can be applied
also to interactions between agents and other entities (such as databases), and the same
roles can be applied to similar scenarios, allowing thus a solution reusability. Of course,
since roles embed the interaction logic, it is important to grant a good security level on the
actions an agent can perform through the roles it is playing. So far, several role approaches
have been proposed [6], and with regard to security in the role, one thing that seems
common to all existing approaches is that they conceive security at the whole role level,
which means for example denying the role use if an agent is not authorized. Instead, in
this paper, we propose an approach with a granularity at the role operation level, thus finer
than in other role approaches. To achieve this granularity, our approach, which is applied
to Java agents and roles, relies on the use of the Java Authentication and Authorization
System (JAAS) [16,7], the result thus being compliant with the Java 2 platform.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 details some concepts concerning roles and
security issues using them, showing also a simple application scenario; Section 3 gives
an overview of the JAAS architecture; Section 4 provides an overview of our approach
while Section 5 gives a more complex case study, completed with the related Java code;
Section 6 reports related work and compares our approach to similar ones. Finally, come
the conclusions.
2. Roles at work
The role concept represents a powerful design pattern for modeling agent interactions,
allowing separation of concern and code reusability in software development and
maintenance [2,1]. Any role can be thought of as a stereotype of a behaviour common
to different agents, and in a more practical way, it can be defined as a set of capabilities
and an expected behaviour [2] that agents can exploit during their lives. Exploiting a
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Fig. 1. An agent exploits the voter role to express the user’s vote.
role means that the agent is in charge of assuming it, using then the capabilities that
the role itself grants, and releasing it when it is no longer needed. The dynamism of the
assumption/release process is in charge of the role system implementation. On the one
hand, this process can be static, meaning that roles are assigned to agents at the design
phase. On the other hand, it can be very dynamic, meaning that an agent can choose the
roles it is going to play at run-time, even on the basis of gathered information from the
execution environments. Roles allow the reuse of both code (i.e., the role implementation)
and experience (i.e., the role purpose), allowing developers to build role libraries and
making it possible for other developers to use these libraries for similar purposes in
different scenarios. This leads to a design/development process that is similar to the
component paradigm [15].
Another interesting characteristic of roles is that they can be exploited to manage
permissions, allowing more secure execution environments and, in fact, they have already
been exploited in security control systems, such as the role based access control [13].
Since roles are mainly used to manage interactions between agents, it is possible to embed
into roles security constraints, in order to get control over the actions performed through
the roles themselves. To better explain this concept, consider a user agent (UA) in charge
of voting on behalf of its owner in an e-democracy scenario [5]. In this situation, it is
possible to develop a voter role that a UA can exploit to register the user’s vote in the
e-democracy database (see Fig. 1). Since a UA, acting on the behalf of its user, exploits the
role capabilities, it is not in charge of knowing the details concerning the vote registration:
the role does “know” how to connect to the e-democracy system and to put the vote. In
order to take into account security, the role can be developed to exchange only encrypted
data with the e-democracy system, which means that the vote will be encrypted before it is
sent to the database. This simple example shows how it is possible to exploit roles in order
to enforce security and to take control over interactions. Furthermore, the above example
represents also a case of use of roles that enforces local policies; in fact, if the database
does not accept connections from UAs that are not playing the voter role, each agent is
forced to use that role (and thus to use the cryptographic algorithm embedded into the
role itself) to put its vote. Moreover, since roles are tied to the local execution context [2],
each different e-democracy scenario is free to choose the adoption of cryptography and the
related cipher algorithm as well.
Several role approaches have been proposed [6], each one with its own concept of secu-
rity through roles. In general, the role approaches adopt a point of view about security that
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considers any role as a whole, which means that they base security on allowing/denying
the assumption of a certain role. It is important to note that security cannot be applied from
just a static point of view, but must take into account run-time conditions. This means that a
security policy must be as dynamic as possible and therefore the role system itself must be
dynamic. Nevertheless, a whole role security means that roles must be developed as small
entities, providing as few capabilities as possible; otherwise denying a role assumption will
lead to the denying of safe capabilities. Let us consider again the example of Fig. 1, and
suppose that the voter role provides two capabilities: get_subject, that checks for the current
voting subject, and vote, that performs the voting action. Now, imagine that a UA does not
own rights to vote (e.g., it represents an under-age user), and imagine that, like most role
approaches, it is not allowed to assume the voter role. In this way, such an agent will not
be able to exploit any capability provided by the voter role, even the safe get_subject. This
leads to an awkward situation, since in a role system that performs a security policy at
the whole role level, the only way to permit the under-age UA to exploit the get_subject
service is to embed the above capability in a separated role, allowing the UA to assume
the one with the safe service and denying the assumption of the voter role. This will lead
to the production of a lot of roles, since the capabilities embedded in any one of them
will reduce in order to allow a fine grain in security control. As consequence, the effort of
role developers increases and the assumption process turns out complicated, since it now
considers several roles, because there are several roles to consider [8].
Starting from the above considerations, we decided to propose an approach that enforces
security on role capabilities, in order to perform security checks with a fine grain, focusing
on each role operation. Our approach has been integrated in the RoleX environment [8],
producing a second version of this Java role system for mobile agents with a high degree
of dynamism in the role assumption/release process. In fact, the first version of RoleX
only provided support for Java permissions associated with roles. Although the approach
described in this paper has been applied to RoleX, it can be integrated into several role
systems, because it is very general.
3. Introduction to JAAS
The Java Authentication and Authorization System (JAAS) [16], provided with the Java
2 platform, is a mechanism used to manage user authentication in Java programs. All main
classes are contained in the javax.security.auth package, but programs that use JAAS need
to interact with only three classes of them: LoginContext, Subject and PrivilegedAction
(see Fig. 2).
In JAAS, authentication is performed through a login action, which, if successfully
carried out, provides also a set of extended permissions and, thus, authorizations. Logins
are related to a specific context, that represents an application scenario. The use of contexts
allows the definition of a modularized system, where each single scenario can exploit its
own login procedures. Moreover, thanks to the use of login contexts, the same component
(or user) is able to login into different scenarios at the same time, exploiting thus the
acquired permissions for each context; on the other hand, the use of contexts allows the
administrator to define with a fine granularity permissions associated with each action.
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Fig. 2. JAAS main component classes.
The first JAAS component an application must deal with is the LoginContext, a class
in charge of defining the JAAS structures for a login into a specific context. In fact,
the application requires for the LoginContext the login for a specific context; then the
LoginContext creates all JAAS objects required to manage the login for that context
(see Fig. 2). In particular, the LoginContext reads a configuration file, called the JAAS
Configuration File, that specifies for each context which LoginModule must be used, and
further, the kind of login. The LoginModule is a component in charge of checking the
login data (e.g., a password) in order to establish whether the login can be successfully
carried out or not. Through the JAAS configuration file, administrators can change the login
procedure, defining that a specific login context must be handled by a username/password
pair, by a shared secret (e.g., a PGP key), etc. The LoginModule is the implementation of
the login procedure; for example for a login driven by a couple username–password on a
Unix system, the LoginModule could be a reader for the /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow
files. Login modules are stackable, and a JAAS developer (or an administrator) can specify
that a login procedure must be performed through several login modules.
If the login “successes” (i.e., the LoginModule has verified that login data is right), the
LoginContext returns an instance of Subject. A Subject object represents a certificate for the
login, and means that the entity that required the login is now authenticated in the context.
Please note that, even if an entity has already authenticated itself in JAAS, every operation
must be done presenting the Subject object as a login certificate; otherwise the operations
will be performed as an unauthenticated entity. This also allows an entity to perform certain
operations with different certificates (i.e., logins) depending on the permissions required
for performing such operations.
Once authenticated, operations must be performed through the doAs(..) method of the
class Subject, that presents the following prototype:
static Object doAs(Subject cert, PrivilegedAction op)
where cert is the Subject instance obtained at the login time, op is the wrapper for the
operation to perform (detailed later in this section) and the return value (of the operation) is
a generic Object. Please note that the above method is static, which means that the Subject
class has a double meaning: when used to create object instances, they represent successful
login certificates; when used as a class it represents the way to perform authenticated
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operations with permissions acquired at the login time. The use of the doAs(..) method
is very similar to the use of the doPrivileged(..) method of the class AccessController of
the Java 2 platform; the only difference is that in this case the method requires the login
certificate while the latter does not.
A PrivilegedAction represents a wrapper around the real operation to execute; thus the
JAAS system can execute the operation through a common API interface. In particular, it is
the run() method of the PrivilegedAction class that wraps the operation to execute. In other
words, to obtain a wrapper of the operation, it is required to write a class implementing the
PrivilegedAction interface, and to put the code to execute into its run() method; thus JAAS
will be able to execute such a code as a privileged operation.
In Fig. 2 there are other components of the JAAS architecture not explained yet. Two
strictly related to each other are Callback and CallbackHandler. Callbacks are modules
in charge of storing login data (e.g., a password) in order to allow their further evaluation
from the LoginModule. A CallbackHandler is a container of callbacks, which eases the use
of a set of callbacks (even if the number of callbacks is not known a priori). What happens
is that the LoginContext passes the CallbackHandler (and thus all Callbacks contained in
it) to the LoginModule that can so evaluate login data.
The last concept that must be explained concerns (extended) permissions, granted
by a successful login. In a standard Java application, permissions are managed by the
SecurityManager and the AccessController, and they are defined and stored in a policy file
(usually the .java.policy file). In JAAS, another policy file is added,1 and this file contains
the definition of permissions that must be granted to an authenticated entity once it has
logged in.
Please note that the authentication phase is in charge of the application itself, which
means that the application should “manually” ask the JAAS system to authenticate itself.
In other words, the JAAS system does not explicitly ask the application to authenticate
itself, but simply denies some operations if the application has not authenticated itself (i.e.,
if the application does not provide a valid Subject instance).
4. Implementing a JAAS based role system
In the previous section, readers have been introduced to the concept of role and to the
JAAS architecture. This section shows how our approach merges the two in order to obtain
a JAAS based role implementation.
4.1. Motivating the use of JAAS
Our approach provides two kinds of fine grain permission managements [7]: it allows
one to take control over (i) any single operation and over (ii) any specific agent instance,
depending on the run-time constraints. The first type of granularity has already been
introduced with the example of Fig. 1; the idea is to authenticate the agent/role couple
operation before the agent can perform a role operation. In this way, if the agent is
successfully authenticated, it can continue performing the role operation; otherwise it
1 There is not a specific name or location for this policy file.
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cannot. The authentication is not meant at the role level, in the sense that each possible
dangerous role operation must perform an authentication before it proceeds. The second
kind of granularity can be obtained with a pre-authentication process, which will be
detailed in the following.
The Java standard SecurityManager, based on a policy file mechanism, is not enough for
our purposes since it allows only to set permissions for groups of entities, such as agents
(e.g., “all agents coming from host XYZ cannot write in the local filesystem”), without
control over single agent instances because the authentication is done at the agent class
level. To have a fine grain permission management we propose to apply JAAS to Java
agent contexts.
Agent applications are not like standard applications, because of their dynamism and
since they are less user interactive. Therefore, the JAAS architecture does not suffice as
it is, and there is the need to build a more specific authentication mechanism, able to
autonomously decide at run-time whether an agent can be authenticated. This can be done
by means of a supervisor agent (SA), launched by each host administrator, which can
monitor the system extending the JAAS authentication decision system.
Application agents have to ask the SA to authenticate them, before performing role
operations, by means of JAAS callbacks. In fact, the SA gives the right callbacks to the
agents that request authentication, so that they can interact with JAAS to obtain an effective
authentication. However, the fact that an application agent obtains the callbacks does not
mean it will automatically be authenticated by the JAAS system. Therefore, using a SA the
authorization process is split into two parts (i.e., pre-authentication and authentication).
The SA grants a pre-authentication, based on run-time information, while the JAAS
architecture, managed by the human administrator, provides the latter authentication step,
statically set.
4.2. Pre-authentication
In our approach, the SA assumes a role (authenticator role) to authenticate other
agents/roles. Since roles tied to the same application context are developed with respect
to each other [2], they can know which is the role that the SA will assume to authenticate
them, becoming the authenticating entity. Starting from the above consideration, each role
in a context is able to find the authenticator entity (i.e., the supervisor agent that is playing
the authenticator role for that context), communicating with it to get callbacks. As shown
in Fig. 3, the SA can assume the right authentication role for each of different application
contexts to authenticate requests coming from different contexts.
4.3. Authentication
As shown in Fig. 4, for example, agent A plays the role Role_A belonging to the context
A, needs to be authenticated and for this reason (a) asks its context-specific authenticator
role Authorizer A (owned by the SA) for the callbacks; thanks to its role, the SA sends back
the needed callbacks (b) and then (c) the agent A and its role Role_A use these callbacks
to authenticate themselves in the JAAS architecture.
If the JAAS authentication is successful, as detailed in Section 3, an instance of the
Subject class will be returned from JAAS; this instance represents an operation certificate,
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Fig. 3. The supervisor agent can exploit different roles to manage different contexts.
Fig. 4. Requesting callbacks to the supervisor agent, and then authenticating into JAAS.
needed to continue with the role operation execution. In fact, our approach reaches the role
operation granularity by using the above operation certificate as a requested data for the
operation execution: if the agent does not own the operation certificate, it cannot execute
the role operations. Furthermore, each dangerous role operation should require a different
operation certificate from the other operations; thus the agent that has obtained a certificate
for one operation cannot adopt it to perform another operation.
4.4. Acquiring agent data for JAAS
Since a mobile agent can move from one host to another, it must carry authentication
data from the home node (from which it is launched) during its trip path. User
authentication is simpler than agent authentication, since callbacks can acquire needed
data by asking the user in an interactive way. In the case of agents, this cannot happen, so
that callbacks must extract authentication data from agents.
First of all, note that an agent should carry data in a suitable way for roles, so that agents
can provide them to callbacks. A good way to transport “personal” data, so that it can be
used by roles, is by the exploitation of hash-maps [2]. With this approach a callback that,
for example, needs to acquire the “home node” can simply search for it in the map.
Please note that application agents do not know exactly which data (i.e., which map
entries) are required to authenticate them, since each target host can require different data.
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Nevertheless, since roles are tied to any local context, roles related to the same context
are developed with respect to the others; that is, each authenticator role assumed by the
SA knows how application agent roles work and which data can be extracted from agents.
This means that the authorizer role returns callbacks developed according to the other agent
roles, so that required data can be easily extracted.
5. A case study
This section presents a concrete mobile agent application, based on roles, that has been
treated as a case study for the proposed JAAS authentication mechanism.
5.1. The MailConfigurator application
The application, MailConfigurator [3,4] aims at helping users registering e-mail
accounts, then configuring, transparently, their e-mail client programs.
The MailConfigurator behaviour can be summarized in the following steps (see Fig. 5):
(a) The user who wants to register a new account is in charge of starting the application
on her host; that means a new mobile agent (called the personal agent) is created. The
personal agent (PA) collects preferences about the e-mail account to subscribe (e.g.,
protocol type, minimum available space), and then starts a trip around different mail
providers in order to find the one that can match the user’s wishes.
(b) On each mail provider, the PA interacts with a resident agent, called the mail provider
agent, that is in charge of administrating the mail provider software, accepting,
processing and allowing/denying the incoming requests from the PAs.
(c) In the case where the interaction between the above kinds of agents is successful (i.e.,
the mail provider has registered the requested account), the mail provider agent returns
a registration voucher to the PA; the voucher contains all data required to configure the
user e-mail client (e.g., host name, port, protocol). If the interaction is unsuccessful,
the personal agent moves to another mail provider and repeats the interaction with its
mail provider agent.
(d) Once the PA has obtained the registration voucher, it comes back home and configures
transparently the user’s e-mail client, notifying her when this has been done, and thus
she can start immediately using her new e-mail account.
As shown in Fig. 5, the mail provider agent interacts with the mail provider software
in order to check whether the account registration can be done or not. For example, the
mail provider agent has to check whether the requested username is already in use or
not, and whether the requested protocol is supported, and to do so, it must “ask” the mail
server software. In other words, the mail provider agent acts also as an interface to the
mail provider software, allowing the PAs to indirectly interact with the latter. The use of an
intermediate agent (the mail provider agent) as interface to the mail server software grants
security, scalability and portability: security because the mail provider agent can apply
security constraints during the interaction with the PAs, in order to verify their credentials;
scalability because the mail provider agent can be cloned, leading to a MAS where each
mail provider agent is in charge of serving a specified number of requests; and finally
136 G. Cabri et al. / Science of Computer Programming 59 (2006) 127–146
Fig. 5. Steps of the MailConfigurator application.
portability since the mail provider agent can exhibit the same interface independently of
the mail provider software that it is “masquerading” as.
5.2. Exploiting roles in MailConfigurator
In the above subsection, the MailConfigurator application has been described only
talking about agents, but it deeply exploits roles in all the phases and for all agents. In fact,
the PA exploits three different roles depending on the situation it is living in, while the
mail provider agent exploits a single role (see Table 1). The exploitation of roles makes the
application adaptable and flexible, granting also a good degree of maintainability. Thanks
to roles, the development of the application components (i.e., the agents) is simple and
fast, since roles allow one to clearly decouple concerns. For example, considering the
first phase of the application, when the personal agent collects the user’s preferences, it
is possible to produce different implementations of the data_collector role so as to
meet different user behaviours: there can be an implementation that interactively asks the
user her preferences through a set of dialog windows, another that performs the collection
through a text based interface, or using a speech recognition engine, or in a non-interactive
way, etc. The point here is that it is possible to quickly change the behaviour of the personal
agent, changing its role implementation, while the agent and its mobility logic remain the
same. In other words, thanks to the use of roles, it is possible to uncouple the development
of the agent into two main parts: (i) the agent and its search logic and (ii) the interaction
logic.
Similar considerations can be given for all the other roles of the personal agent. For
example, different implementations of the parameter_setter role can handle different
e-mail clients, allowing the personal agent to configure each specific client. The subscriber
role, instead, is used by the personal agent in order to provide to the mail provider agent
information (i.e., user’s preferences) in a way it can understand. For example, some mail
providers could require a cryptographic exchange of data between agents, for security
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Table 1
Roles in the MailConfigurator application
Role name Exploited by Exploited to
data_collector
personal agent
Acquire the user’s preferences for the e-mail account
the agent has to register.
subscriber Interact with the mail provider agent.
parameter_setter Configure the user’s e-mail client.
administrator mail provider agent Interact with the personal agent.
Fig. 6. Steps of the application redesigned with roles.
reasons; thus the subscriber role is in charge of knowing the cryptographic algorithm
used on that host. Here, again, it is possible to note how roles ease the development: if
a provider decides to change its cryptographic algorithm, it is in charge only of providing
a new subscriber implementation, while the personal agent will not require any change.
Furthermore, since roles are dynamically exploited at run-time and are locally tied (i.e.,
they belong to a context and are not moved with the agent), an agent is free to move
across different hosts exploiting a different role implementation on each of them. Thus, for
example, a personal agent could use a cryptographic transmission on a mail provider, and
a plain data exchange on another, and this happens transparently.
The last role shown in Table 1, administrator, is exploited by the mail provider agent.
This role has a double meaning: (i) it allows the agent to rightly interact with the mail server
software and (ii) it allows the agent to understand and use the data provided by the personal
agent.
Due to the above explained roles, the Fig. 5 changes into Fig. 6 showing each exploited
role; please note that all the above agent interactions happen thanks to and through roles.
5.3. Security problems in MailConfigurator
The application described above can suffer from different security risks, in particular
due to the fact that the personal agents are in charge of transporting the user’s preferences
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and, in the case of success, data that can be used to access the user’s e-mail account.
Moreover, it is possible that faking and malicious personal agents try to do actions they
cannot do. For example, a malicious agent could try to directly interact with the mail
provider software, or to wrongly configure an e-mail client. While the protection of sensible
data (e.g., the user’s preferences) is not the subject of this paper, the latter cases are those
this paper focuses on: the control of agent actions, being these actions done through a
particular role.
Embedding a security mechanism into the role the agent is going to assume allows the
system to recognize a malicious behaviour just before it happens. This is an active way
of enforcing security, since it operates at a fine grain and at run-time, depending on the
dynamic agent behaviour.
5.4. Code samples
This section shows some code pieces related to the embedding of JAAS in roles,
taking into account the application MailConfigurator. In particular, as regards the role
parameter_setter, this section shows how to protect the execution of a possibly
dangerous task, like the access to the configuration of the user mail client. The specific role
operation is called conf(there is not a specific name or location for this file)igureClient,
and is implemented through the namesake method in the above role.
In order to focus on JAAS, this section will not show the complete implementation
of the selected role, using the code as a pure sample. Please note that, due to the JAAS
architecture (see Section 3), the role developer is in charge of defining several classes other
than that of the role itself, and in particular a login module and one (or more) callbacks are
required.
5.5. The operation wrapper
The first step is to define the operation wrapper for the configureClient operation,
and to embed it into a PrivilegedAction. This section does not cover the details about the
configuration of the e-mail client, since those details are too strictly related to the mail
client type; nevertheless please note that it suffices to change the ClientConfigurator class
to provide different e-mail client support.
To define the operation wrapper, the programmer is in charge of building a class that
implements the PrivilegedAction Java interface and that performs the operation code in the
run() method, as in Fig. 7.
As readers can see, the code of Fig. 7 stores the configuration parameters of the
registered mailbox (e.g., outgoing server name, port) and then uses those parameters to
perform the configuration in the run() method. Please note that the latter is executed every
time the agent calls doAs(..) of the Subject class (see Section 3).
5.6. The role code
Once the operation has been written, the programmer can embed it in the role code.
Since the configuration operation is represented by the configureClient() method of the
role, the code of Fig. 8 is a possible implementation of such a behaviour.
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public class ClientConfigurationOperation implements PrivilegedAction{
// the mailbox registration parameters
MailboxParameters par;
// constructor
public ClientConfigurationOperation(MailboxParameters params) {
par = params;
}
// operation code
public Object run() {
// get the configurator for the kind of client
// (automatically from a system property)
try{
ClientConfigurator conf =
MailConfiguratorFactory.getClientConfigurator();
conf.writeConfiguration(par);
} catch(UnsupportedClientException e) {}
}
}
Fig. 7. The e-mail client configuration code.
public class parameter_setter {
// the parameter acquired from the registration process
private MailboxParameters pars;
// credentials of the agent
Hashmap credentials;
void configureClient() {
// acquire callbacks from the supervisor agent
// (pre-authentication)
Callback cb[] = . . .
// create a callback handler
Mail_callbackhandler cbh = new Mail_callbackhandler (cb,credentials);
// now login into JAAS
try {
LoginContext lc = new LoginContext("parameter_setter_role" , cbh);
if( lc.login() ) { // execute the operation
Subject operationCertificate = lc.getSubject();
Subject.doAs(operationCertificate,
new ClientConfigurationOperation(pars));
lc.logout();
}
}
catch( LoginException e ) { // login failed }
}
}
Fig. 8. The code of the role operation.
The first step is to obtain the callbacks that must be used for the JAAS login, and
as detailed in Section 4.2, this is done through a pre-authentication. Pre-authentication
implies contacting the SA and obtaining, through its authorizer role, the set of callbacks;
the related code is not shown in the figure, since it is tied to the role system implementation.
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public class PreviousHostCallback implements
javax.security.auth.callback.Callback {
protected URL previousHost=null;
public void acquireData(Hashmap credentials) {
// search for the previous host in the credentials hash and store it
this.previousHost= credentials.get(“previousHost”);
}
public String getHost() { return this.previousHost.toString(); }
}
Fig. 9. An example of Callback.
As an example, in RoleX, the pre-authentication could be done by sending a request event
to the supervisor agent, that replies with the given callbacks.
The bold part of Fig. 8 performs the login into the JAAS architecture. As detailed in
Section 3, the first step is the use of a LoginContext object, that is built specifying the
callbacks and the context identifier (in this case parameter_setter_role). Then the login is
tried, calling the login() method; in the case of success, an operation certificate, that is, the
Subject object, is obtained by the LoginContext. Finally, using the static method doAs(..),
an operation of the ClientConfigurationOperation kind is executed. As already stressed,
the difference between the execution of such an operation through the doAs(..) method or
not affects the permissions with which a role operation is executed, which depend on the
operation certificate (i.e., the Subject instance) the role has obtained from the login.
An important thing to note here is that the PA has no view of the JAAS login, which
is dealt with in the parameter_setter role; thus the agent (and its developer) does not
have to worry about JAAS details. Of course, it is important that the role has access to
the agent credentials, since they will be used for the login; however the credentials can be
easily passed from the agent to the role (and vice versa) by means of a hash-map [2].
5.7. Callback and CallbackHandler implementations
As detailed in Section 3, the LoginContext and the LoginModule use a set of Callbacks
in order to acquire the login data, for a further evaluation. Starting from this consideration,
there must be an implementation of each callback, such as that of a CallbackHandler, that
is a container for a set of related callback objects.
The definition of a callback can be quite straightforward, since the only thing to do
is the implementation of the tagged interface Callback, as shown in Fig. 9. The callback
shown simply acquires, from the agent credentials, the previous host the agent has visited;
the value is then stored in a protected field (previousHost), for a further evaluation that will
be done calling the getHost() method.
Please remember that developers can provide as many callbacks as they need, even more
complex than the one shown in Fig. 9. Once callbacks are ready, they must be put into a
handler; thus developers must provide an implementation of a CallbackHandler, like the
one shown in Fig. 10.
As readers can see, the callback handler in Fig. 10 simply stores the set of callbacks
(as an array) and the agent credentials, in order to pass them to the callbacks that require
to know something about the agent. When the LoginModule or the LoginContext needs to
G. Cabri et al. / Science of Computer Programming 59 (2006) 127–146 141
public class Mail_callbackhandler
implements javax.security.auth.callback.CallbackHandler {
// keep the agent credentials map
private Hashmap credentials = null;
// all my callbacks
Callback cb[] = null;
public Mail_callbackhandler (Callback calls[], Hashmap hm ) {
this.cb = calls;
this.credentials = hm;
this.handle( this.cb );
}
// set callbacks data
public void handle ( Callback []cb ) throws
IOException, UnsupportedCallbackException {
for ( int i=0; i< cb.length; i++ ) { // cast the callback and set its data
if ( cb[i] instanceof PreviousHostCallback ) {
((PreviousHostCallback)cb[i]).acquireData(this.credentials );
}
else
if ( cb[i] instanceof ... ) {...}
else
throw new UnsupportedCallbackException();
}
}
}
Fig. 10. The callback handler implementation.
deal with callbacks, the method handle(..) of the interface CallbackHandler will be called.
As shown in the figure, the method iterates on each callback, casting it into the right type
and requiring the callback to acquire data. Before this moment, no data is acquired by any
callback, even if the handler has already all the credentials of the agent.
Since the callback handler has been exploited, its method handle(..) has been called
to collect all the data required for the login. In other words, the handle(..) method must
initialize in the appropriate way each callback; thus the login will proceed with the required
data.
5.8. Login modules: Validating agent’s login
Callbacks and callback handlers are used only to acquire agent’s credentials, waiting for
their later evaluation, that is done through a LoginModule, which is in charge of analyzing
agent’s data at run-time, allowing or denying the login.
As detailed in Section 3, the LoginModule depends on the application context,
and the binding between a particular module and its context is set in the JAAS
configuration file. This file must contain the fully qualified name of the class used
as the login module, in order to instrument the LoginContext about the instance
to create and use as the LoginModule once the request of login in a context
arrives. As shown in Fig. 11, for the context parameter_setter_role the class
brain.MailConfigurator.MailLoginModule must be created and used as the login
142 G. Cabri et al. / Science of Computer Programming 59 (2006) 127–146
// in the configuration file
parameter_setter_role { brain.MailConfigurator.MailLoginModule REQUIRED; }
Fig. 11. The JAAS configuration file entry.
public class MailLoginModule
implements javax.security.auth.spi.LoginModule {
private CallbackHandler cbh = null;
private Principal agentPrincipal = null;
private Subject mySubject = null; // get from the initialize() method
// automatically
// login method
public boolean login()
throws LoginException {
try {
success = true;
Callback[] cb = this.cbh.cb;
for( int i=0; i<cb.length; i++ ) {
if(cb[i] instanceof PreviousHostCallback &&
&& !((PreviousHostCallback)cb[i]).getHost.equals("mailprovider.edu")){
success = false; agentPrincipal = new ...;
}
else // other checks
return success;
} catch( Exception e ) {
throw new LoginException(); }
}
//complete the login
boolean commit() throws LoginException{
mySubject.getPrincipals.add(agentPrincipal); return true;
}
}
Fig. 12. The LoginModule implementation.
module. Please note that the context is the same that was specified for the LoginContext in
Fig. 8. The keyword REQUIRED means that the login can be considered as successful if
and only if the MailLoginModule confirms it.
As regards the code of the login module, a possible implementation could be the one
reported in Fig. 12.
The most important method of each login module is the login() one, that is called
through the LoginContext.login() one. As shown in Fig. 12, the method is in charge of
evaluating data acquired from callbacks through the callback handler, and thus the method
extracts each callback contained in the handler and tries to cast it into the right type, for
evaluating the data. As an example, this code shows the extraction of the previous host
from the PreviousHostCallback of Fig. 9, checking whether the value is equal to the host
mailprovider.edu, that is supposed to be the only mail provider the user has confidence
in.2 If the last host does not correspond, the login is denied; otherwise another callback is
2 The test on the name of the last visited host is shown only to keep the example simple, and to allow readers to
focus on concepts strictly related to the JAAS proposed implementation. Production code should perform more
complex tests.
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checked. Supposing that all callbacks provide data evaluated as right for the login, the login
can be successfully done, and since the above module is the only one required to complete
the login, the agent can be authenticated for the specified context. The role operation can
now proceed; thus the agent will execute the role operation with different privileges than
without using JAAS.
6. Related work
This section shows a few approaches related to security applied to agents and roles,
briefly comparing them to our approach.
The Naplet system [19] is a mobile agent system that exploits some Java security
concepts, like subject and login context, in order to implement a secure environment for
the execution of agent services and actions. In this system, each agent is a naplet, that is an
agent associated with a set of principals or credentials. Each time a naplet (i.e., a mobile
agent) arrives at a remote host, the host allows the execution of the agent code through the
Java Subject object obtained from the principals/credentials the naplet is carrying. In other
words, from the naplet principals/credentials, the remote host extracts a Subject object, that
is then used to invoke methods (i.e., execute the naplet code) on the naplet agent itself, as
shown below:
...
Subject napletExtractedSubject = Runtime.authenticate(naplet);
// the “naplet” is the agent object
AccessController.checkPermission();
Subject.doAsPrivileged(
napletExtractedSubject, new PrivilegedAction() { naplet.init(); }, null);
...
The extraction of the Subject object from the naplet, and the following code execution,
is performed by the naplet server, an entity in charge of receiving and authenticating the
incoming agents; in other words, the Naplet architecture cannot work without the support
of an appropriate naplet server.
The Naplet approach is really interesting, even if it has a few drawbacks when compared
to ours. First of all, while our approach can be easily integrated into existing agent based
systems, Naplet requires the use of specific agent classes, as a specific server, as well. This
means that, instead of integrating a security approach into existing mobile agent platforms,
Naplet proposes a completely different mobile agent approach, that takes care of security
issues. A second drawback of Naplet is that it is focused on a whole agent (a naplet)
approach instead of on a single agent service approach. Even if, as Naplet authors state,
the system can be used to implement a role based secure architecture, an access control on
each single service of the agent could become awkward.
Another interesting approach, specially role-oriented, is GAIA [18], that defines a
methodology for the definitions of organizations of agents, where different roles interact.
From a security point of view, GAIA associates with each role a set of permissions,
which are rights that are further associated with the agent playing that role. GAIA does
not define a formal notation to define roles, but exploits a formal notation to express
permissions associated with roles, and thanks to this notation designers and developers
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can strictly decide what a role can or cannot do. Being a model, GAIA does not propose
an implementation of its role system, and thus of its permission logic; this implies that its
implementation could be not based on a standard approach, like JAAS. Furthermore, while
our approach can be applied to several role systems without requiring changes to those
systems, the GAIA approach defines rules applicable to the GAIA system itself. Finally,
it must be noted that, in the GAIA approach, permissions are statically defined, while in
our approach, thanks also to the use of the supervisor agent, permissions can be changed
depending on run-time constraints.
An approach not tied to the agent world is Locale-BAC (Locale Based Access
Control) [17], which focuses on the importance of the context where roles are exploited. In
fact, it is important to exploit contextual information for authorization decisions, since the
context can introduce another level of evaluation. For this reason, this approach does not
state what an entity can or cannot do depending only on the role it is playing, but focuses on
the contexts it is active in and how these contexts change while the application is running.
To reach its aim, this approach extends the RBAC definition [14] with a locale, a multi-
session collaborative environment where entities playing roles must establish a session to
be active in. Thanks to the locale, the system has an extended view over the whole situation;
thus it can make security decisions related to the system life and its evolution. Compared to
our approach, Locale-BAC is surely more strict and formal, defining also its own language
for role and access specifications, but it does not propose a real implementation that
developers can exploit in their applications. Furthermore, it must be noticed that context
information is evaluated also in our approach, thanks to the use of the supervisor agent.
7. Conclusions
This paper has presented an approach that exploits the Java Authentication and
Authorization System (JAAS) in order to perform security checks on single operations
for each role assumed by Java agents. The key idea of this approach is that it is possible
to analyze data carried by the agent (contained in a kind of hash-map) in order to extract
values suitable for an authentication process. Each role operation that needs authorization
must be developed in order to extract that data from the agent credentials, and requiring
JAAS to authenticate the agent on the basis of that data. The authentication process depends
on the callbacks obtained by the role from an authenticator entity, which could be a
supervisor agent. Once the authentication has been passed with success, the agent can
continue performing the specific role operation.
The advantages of this approach are that it promotes a fine grain control over roles,
allowing developers to manage security at a single role operation for each different agent
instance (even of the same class). In fact, other approaches adopt either a coarse grain
control over roles because of the “group” management performed by the standard Java
SecurityManager, or a management at the whole role level, allowing/denying the role
assumption. We have integrated this approach into our RoleX role system, obtaining its
second version. In our approach, the authentication process is transparent to the agents,
which simply use roles; thanks to that, our approach does not require changes to the role
system implementation and can be easily integrated into already existing roles without
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requiring changes to the agents that must use those roles. Moreover, since our approach
is based on a component of the Java 2 architecture, it can be integrated in other software
systems and can adhere to the security policies promoted by the Java platform.
Future work will deeply explore the problem of the credential acquisition, which
actually represents the greater difficulty of the implementation of this approach. In fact,
it could happen that the agent is not carrying all the data required for the authentication;
in this case authentication should proceed on the basis of other credentials the agent owns.
The use of credentials that are not ad hoc makes the authentication difficult, leading to a
trust problem.
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